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Abstract 
 
 
This study analyzes the economic returns to schooling decisions made by high school graduates in 
Colombia. We wanted to verify if the economic returns (wages) obtained by new postsecondary education 
graduates compensate for the economic and psychological investment they made to get that academic 
degree. To answer that question, we estimated these economic returns for each type of postsecondary degree 
available in Colombia (technical education, technological education, undergraduate studies, graduate studies) 
by origin of the institution (public or private). Our methodological strategy includes the generation of a 
micro-database that contains agents’ socio-economic backgrounds and also their individual labor market 
outcomes. Because agents with very similar characteristics and the same schooling decisions might obtain 
different economic returnsfrom education, we considered as part of our empirical strategy the inclusion of 
an approximation of agents’ cognitive abilities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Essentially, postsecondary education demand is based on students’ perceptions about their future economic 
returns. Nevertheless, these economic returns depend not only on the academic degree achieved but also on 
aspects such as the characteristics of the institution where the student obtained that degree, the features of 
the program he chose and the student’s inherent cognitive abilities.  
 
However, as Maxwell (1970) and Dolton and Vignoles (2000) show, investingin postsecondary education 
does notguarantee economic returns that pay off thefinancial and psychological investment the student 
made. 
 
As result of this uncertainty about the future economic returns, the education system might suffer a loss of 
efficiency. First, an excess of demand for educational programs in specific knowledge areas can affect the 
costs of the programs, lower their quality and create a vicious circle affecting the expected economic returns. 
Second, any change of perception about the expected economic returns may increase desertion or extend 
the regular education cycle. Third, this uncertainty prevents policy makers from properly identifyingwhere to 
focus the funding and where to increase the education coverage. Finally, if there is no accuracy about the 
economic returns of postsecondary education, the investment made by the government is not optimal and is 
therefore not aligned with the productivity objectives of the country. 
 
                                                             
1Universidad EAFIT, Medellín – Colombia.  
2Universidad EAFIT, Medellín – Colombia, Carrera 49 N° 7 Sur – 50, Bloque 26, segundo piso (Escuela de Economía y 
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That is why the relevance of estimating the economic returns topostsecondaryeducation can be considered 
from different perspectives. From an individual perspective, it can determine if the investment a person 
makes to get that academic degree is compensated by a wage premium. From a labor market perspective, to 
estimate these economic returns will help validate if it is easier for an individual with a postsecondary 
educational level to get a better job (higher salary) than without that academic degree. Finally, from a public 
policy perspective, these estimations could help government to target the investmenton education more 
efficiently by focusing on academic degrees that bring higher economic returns to individuals, which means 
they are more productive. 
 
Colombia is a perfect scenario to study the economic returns to postsecondary education due tothe 
availability of important information at the individual level such as socio-economic characteristics, Saber11 
(standardized test) test scores and recently graduate workers’ salaries. Saber 11 is an academic performance 
test taken by senior year students to evaluate their academic competences and abilities developed through 
secondary education. Regarding workers’ salaries, the Employment Observatory for Education (OLE3) 
tracks recently postsecondary graduate students who work in the formal sector of the economy and gathers 
information about their salaries and places where they are working, classified by economic activity. 
 
Our methodology is focused on the estimation of the individual economic returns to each postsecondary 
education degree in Colombia by type of academic degree and origin of institution. Then, we compared the 
returns obtain at university (bachelor degree) with each postsecondary education degree. Our objective is to 
answer: What would have happened to individuals who hold a bachelor degree as their higher educational 
level had they had a different post-secondary education degree? To accomplish our goal, we adapted Reyes 
et al. (2013) empirical strategy that proposes the inclusion of individuals’ abilities in comparing the different 
scenarios of postsecondary education and complemented it with quasi-experimental techniques. 
 
Therefore, the main contribution of this investigation is to include the heterogeneity of the economic 
returns into the analysis; thisis because agents with very similar characteristics and the same schooling 
decisions might get different economic returns. We attribute thesedifferences to cognitive abilities, 
whichalso reflect to an extent the individual’sinnate abilities such as student’s intelligence, an education-
supportiveenvironment, studying habits, motivation and discipline among others. Additionally, these 
characteristics influence studentsmaking their postsecondary schooling decisions, even though theymight 
not be totally aware ofthis.  
 
Our results4 show thatindividuals who attended universities have approximately 7% higher salaries than if 
they had held a technological degree. Nevertheless, their salaries are approximately 9% lower than if they 
had held a professional-technical degree (programs for a particular career or job), 61% lower than if they 
had held a specialization and 84% lower than if they had held a Master’s degree. These results show an 
important impact over individual’s economic returns (wages) once proficiency in a specific field is 
developed. 
 
This first part of thearticlegives an overview about our research. In section two, we depict the Colombian 
postsecondary education system structure and its characteristics,and, in section three, we present a review 
about the economic returns to postsecondary education. Section four encloses our model and empirical 
strategy; it also contains a description of our data and information sources.  
 
Section five describes the results of our estimations. Finally, in section six, we discuss the results and 
provide some conclusions. 
 
 
 
                                                             
3“Observatorio Laboral para la Educación” in Spanish. 
4The estimation controls for individual’s abilities, socioeconomic background, institution’scharacteristics and tuition costs among 
others (these covariates are detailed on Section 4) 
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2. Postsecondary Education in Colombia 
 
As the Colombian Political Constitution of 1991 states, education is a right for Colombian people and also a 
public service that the government has to provide and supervise. That is why the government has the 
responsibility to guarantee adequate coverage and also the minimal conditions for people to access and to 
stay in the education system. 
 
According to the Colombian Ministry of Education (MEN5), the Colombian Education System has five 
different stages: Initial Education, Preschool, Basic Education, Medium Education and Higher Education 
(this last one is known as Educación Superior). Basic Education includes five years of elementary education 
and four years of high school. The fourth stage, called “Medium Education”, includes junior and senior 
years and finalizes with the high school diploma. After receiving the high school diploma and taking a 
compulsory standardized test provided by the government (SABER-11)6, the student can access “Higher 
Education” that,from now on, we will call “Postsecondary Education” to harmonize this term with 
international standards. 
 
There are two different levels of Postsecondary Education: undergraduate and graduate;each of them 
awards different degrees to their graduates. The undergraduate level includes the Technical Level, 
Technological Level and Professional Level.The Graduate level includes Specialization,MasterDegree and 
Doctoral Degree. 
 
It is important to mention that the Colombian Education System proposes propaedeutic cycles (each 
previous education level serves as basis for the next one), which means that students should begin 
postsecondary education at the technical level, then advance until the technological level, get a professional 
degree and then move to a graduate level (specialization then master’s and finally doctorate), to gather 
knowledge and skills at different levels in the same knowledge area. 
 
Postsecondary education is provided by Institutions of Higher Education (IES7), and they can be classified 
by two different criteria. The first one, the academic criteria, reflects the scope each IES has and the 
programs that can be taught at them. The second one is the origin of the institution, which means that the 
IES can be public or private. Table 1 summarizes which type of programs can be given according to the 
academic criteria of the IES. 
 
There is also anothertype of institution that offerssome postsecondary educationbut that we are not 
including in our study because of their educative objectives. The first one is the National Training Service 
SENA (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje), which offers free training programs focused on vulnerable people 
and the unemployed. The second one is the Regional Centers for Higher Education CERES (Centros 
Regionales de Educación Superior),which are decentralized educative centers that offer some postsecondary 
education programs in distant areas; they are supervised academically by one or various IES that are in 
charge of the design and strategy of these programs. 
 
As mentioned before, to access Postsecondary Education, students must present SABER-11 test results. 
This test is provided by ICFES(Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación), the Colombian Institute 
for Educational Evaluation that supports the MEN by providing information related to the quality of 
education of the country. The SABER-11 test measures the achievement of students who are at the senior 
year (last year of secondary education) in sixdifferent areas: Language, Math, Social Sciences, Biology, 
Chemistry and Physics. Each area is graded over 100 points, and even though there is no pass mark, if the 
student gets a score from 0 to 30, it is considered low; if the score is between 30.01 and 70, it is average; 
andif the score is above 70.01, it is considered high. 
                                                             
5In Spanish “Ministerio de Educación Nacional” 
6 It is worth to mention that even though SABER 11 test is compulsory and should be used as reference to admit students in 
postsecondary education, some institutions of postsecondary education prefer to complement it with their own tests to admit 
students. 
7In Spanish: Instituciones de Educación Superior - IES 
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Because of the SABER-11 test design, it grades not only the student’s knowledge about a specific subject, 
but also measureshis competences. These competences can be understood as the mental processes and tools 
that he uses to solve the questions, which reflect somehowthe cognitive abilities of the student. 
 
3. Economic Returns to Postsecondary Education 
 
Every day, young high school graduatesdecide to invest in postsecondary education programs because they 
believe that “education pays off”. People invest not only between three and five years of their lives, but 
alsoconsiderable amounts of money that are usually financed by credit (Eckel et al., 2007; Neill, 2008; 
Carmichael and Finnie, 2008). Their motivation lies in increasing the likelihood of getting a job in the future 
that will generate revenues enough to recover their high investments. 
 
This logic is supported by several academic studies that have demonstrated the existence of a positive 
correlation between the education level and the income of an individual throughout his life (Willis and 
Rosen, 1979; Kane and Rouse, 1995, Card, 1999). Similarly, Cheeseman Day and Newburger (2002) note 
that American workers who hold a bachelor degree earn through their lifetimes approximately 77% higher 
incomes than individuals who only graduate from high school. Among recent studies, Carnevale et al. (2012) 
suggest that postsecondary education is the key to access future economic opportunities because individuals 
with that level of education have substantially higher incomes over their lifetimes (approximately 84%8) 
compared to those who did not attend postsecondary education. 
 
In Latin America, there is also a positive correlation (Psacharopolous and Chu Ng, 1992, Behrman et al., 
2007; Mancorda et al., 2010); nevertheless, the magnitude of the estimated returns is much lower than the 
estimates for developed countries. For example, Contreras et al. (2005) estimated 9% of higher returns for 
individuals with postsecondary education in Chile; Morales-Ramos (2011) estimated returns between 8.2% 
and 8.4% higher per additional year of education in Mexico, while Lustig et al. (2012) notes that tertiary 
education returns are 2 percentage points above the returns to secondary education in Argentina and 4 
percentage points in Brazil. 
 
There are also some studies that analyze the economic returns to Postsecondary Educationspecifically in 
Colombia. Sanchez & Nuñez (2012),for example, based on urban household surveys from 1976 to 
1998,estimated returns to education through a Mincer equation using a cohort technique.  
 
They foundthat individuals who completed college have the highest returns to education and that these 
returns are approximately 80% above of those obtained by individuals who only completed high school. 
 
Mora (2003) applied the Hungerford and Solon Test (1987) to anincome quantile regression using the 
National Household Survey for year 2000. The results of the estimation showed that a university degree 
generates returns between 17.2% and 27.8% compared to returns of high school diploma that range 
between 7.6% and 17.1%. 
 
Garcia et al. (2009), in order to overcome Mincer equation methodological criticisms,estimated the internal 
rate of return to higher education according to the methodology of Heckman et al. (2005). Based on 
National Household Surveys from 2001 to 2005, they estimated an internal rate of return of education as if 
it were a financial project and compared its potential reward to two different interest rates for Colombia 
(fixed term interest rate and the natural interest rate). The results show that university is a high return 
investment and that it is at least 1% above any of the two interest rates. Prada (2006) also found that even 
though the returns to education from university are the highest compared to secondary and primary 
education, they are unstable and very sensitive to changes in the economic cycle. Additionally, for 
individuals who hold a university degree, Forero & Ramirez (2008) identified the most important 
determinants for labor income to be age, gender, parents’ education level, the area of knowledge of the job, 
                                                             
8 During his lifetime, an individual who holds a bachelor degree can earn incomes 84% above the income of individuals with a 
high school diploma. 
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whether the individual lives in the capital city (Bogotá) and whether the IES where the agent obtained the 
degree is certified. 
 
Even though the preceding studies show that in Colombia there are better economic returns for graduates 
who hold a postsecondary degree, there is no study that compares the returns of each postsecondary degree 
to another; these studies also do not include the effect of the cognitive abilities of the individuals as part of 
the explanation of those returns. These abilities are an important factor in making the decision about 
whether to invest in postsecondary education because they reflect the skills an individual has to successfully 
complete the degree he has chosen. 
 
As Hunter (1986) found, general cognitive ability is positively related to performance in all jobs. This implies 
that people with higher cognitive abilities are prone to stand out at work and also at educational processes. 
These cognitive abilities are intellectual skills such as understanding, remembering and reasoning that 
individuals use to solve problems. However, we consider that cognitive skills also reflect to an extent 
unobservable characteristics (noncognitive abilities) such as motivation, habits, preferences, discipline, 
persistence, self-esteem, etc. that cannot be directly observed but also affect the individual’s decisions. 
 
That is the reason why we aim to estimate the rates of return to postsecondary education in Colombia 
controlling for individuals’ cognitive abilities. They will help us capture the unobserved heterogeneity that 
may be causedbypeople with the same endowments and the same postsecondary education degree getting 
different economic returns. 
 
4. Model and Empirical Strategy 
 
We split our empirical strategyinto two different phases. In the first one, we estimated an approximation of 
the individual’s cognitive abilities represented by SABER-11 test results. We consider that, even though 
cognitive skills captured in SABER-11 test results do not totally represent noncognitive abilities, they reflect 
them to a degree. In addition, Heckman et al. (2006a) found that even though cognitive skills affect the 
variance of wages the most, cognitive and noncognitive abilities effects over the variance of wages are very 
similar. 
 
In the second phase, we estimated the labor market outcomes9 for each type of postsecondary degree 
including the previous estimation of abilities as a covariate. We compare basic scenario (Bachelor degree) 
economic returns with the economic returns of Professional-Technical degree, Technological degree, 
Specialization degree and Master degree10. These estimations were made through matching techniques. 
 
4.1. Assessing Individuals’ Abilities 
 
Following Carneiro et al. (2003), Hansen et al. (2004) and Reyes et al. (2013), we used standardized test 
scores (SABER-11 test) to approximate individuals’ abilities. We also kept in mind the assumption proposed 
initially by Heckman et al. (2006a) that states that at the moment the individual makes a decision about his 
postsecondary education, his abilities(cognitive and non-cognitive) are fixed and are known by him but not 
by the researcher. 
 
We used scores of SABER-11 test for the following knowledge areas: language, math, biology, chemistry 
and physics. Because the SABER-11 test is taken at the senior year, these abilities are observed before the 
individual decides which level of postsecondary education to attend. Thus, as mentioned before, they can be 
considered by the individual as a sign of how well prepared he is for postsecondary education. 
 
Because SABER-11 test results are not comparable across years, we calculated percentiles specific for each 
year to have an indicator of the individual’s academic performance by knowledge area. These results were 
used as covariates while applying matching algorithms allowing us to control for individuals’ abilities. 
                                                             
9 We use the terms “labor market outcomes” and “economic returns” interchangeably. 
10 We didnot include “Doctoral Degree” because of the size of our sample (a very small number of doctoral graduates were part 
of OLE’s database) 
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4.2.  Labor Market Outcomes 
 
Weanalyzed the economic returns of postsecondary education through comparison by setting a basic 
scenario (Bachelor degree) and comparing it one by one with the three postsecondary degrees. 
 
The empirical strategy applied consisted of estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
through matching algorithms. By applying this technique, we are able to calculate the economic returns the 
individual who holds a bachelor degree would have had, had he chosen a different postsecondary degree. 
 
To have a proper counterfactual to compare the economic returns with, we represented the individual’s 
decision through a logistic regression of the binary category university/other postsecondary degree. Then, 
we match these individuals with other individuals with similar propensities.  
To estimate this propensity, we controlled for covariates includingindividual’s characteristics, institution 
characteristics, tuition costs and the individual’s abilities (previously estimated) that are summarized in a 
propensity score. 
 
Regarding the identification strategy, matching techniques balance covariate distributions between treated11 
(other postsecondary degree) and non-treated individuals (bachelor degree). The treatment (T) is assigned 
independent of potential outcomes Y(i), where i=1 for other postsecondary degree labor market outcomes 
and i=0 for bachelor degree labor market outcomes. Therefore, we expect similar average outcomes if both 
groups receive the same treatment or if none of them do, which can be represented by the following 
equations: 
 
E[Y(1)|T=1]=E[Y(1)|T=0]=E[Y(1)] (1)  
E[Y(0)|T=1]=E[Y(0)|T=0]=E[Y(0)] (2) 
 
These equations show that the average potential outcome for the treatment group under treatment is equal 
to the average potential outcome of the control group had it been treated (equation 1), and that the average 
potential outcome for the treated group, had it not been treated, is equal to the average potential outcome 
of the control group with no treatment (equation 2). 
 
Based on this, the ATT is estimated using the following equation, where E[Y(0)|T=1] represents the 
counterfactual: 
 
E[Y(1)-Y(0)|T=1]=E[Y(1)|T=1]-E[Y(0)|T=1] (3) 
 
However, the estimation of the ATT would only be correct if treatment were assigned randomly, thus 
making the outcomes independent. Unfortunately, this was not the case because we set which individuals 
were controls and which were to be treated. As a consequence, we will use the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA), which ensures that the distributions of key covariates are balanced across the treatment 
and control groups. 
 
At this point, we have specified our identification strategy (propensity matching score); however, there are 
many matching metrics available to achieve our goals. The best matching metric, the one that provides the 
best balance across our covariates of interest, is the estimations of “nearest neighbor”12, which considers 
each treated (control) unit and searches for a control (treated) unit with the closest propensity score. We 
used the variation in this metric that includes replacement, which means that an untreated individual can be 
used more than once as a match for treated units. 
 
4.3.  Data Description 
 
One of the advantages of our data is that the information at individual level that we have merged hasnot 
been use altogether before, such as the SABER 11 test scores, the socio-economic characteristics of the 
recent graduates, their salaries and the tuition costs of the programs. 
                                                             
11 We will use traditional “matching” jargon and use the term “treatment group” when referring to the other postsecondary degree we are 
comparing the economic returns with, and “control group” when referring to the basic scenario (bachelor degree). 
12 We compared estimations using nearest neighbor (NN) with different metrics, and NN is the one that provided the best balance. 
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Our database includes information from year 2007 until year 2011 restricted to individuals aged 18 until 35 
years old. We used administrative records at the individual level from OLE to get the monthly 
approximation to individuals’ wages (we used as a proxy for salaries the nominal income used to estimate 
the individual’s contributions for health and pensions). We also used information from the OLE related to 
the characteristics of the institutions where the individuals obtained their academic degree.  
 
We integrated this information with individual data from the MEN related to the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the individuals and their households at the time they took the SABER-11 test and of 
course the SABER-11 test scores. Finally, also from the MEN, we gathered information about program’s 
annual tuition costs (provided by program and year). 
 
Unfortunately there are data limitations too, such as that OLE information is only available for 
postsecondary education graduates.  
 
This constraint prevents us from comparing the economic returns with individuals who drop out of 
postsecondary education and also with those who decided not to attend postsecondary education at all. 
 
Our sample has 190,111 observations, and after estimating the returns for the whole sample (general 
estimation) we split it into two different subsamples by origin of the institution (public and private). The 
private subsample has 106,350 observations and the public subsample has 83,761 observations. 
 
The covariates used in the estimations are the individual’s characteristics (age, sex, mother’s education, 
father’s education, and the number of income contributors in the household), individual’s abilities (math, 
language, biology, chemistry and physics SABER-11 test scores13), IES characteristics (if the IES has a high 
quality accreditation, methodology14andtuition costs) andfinally, the number of related undergrad programs 
taken. These covariates were used to estimate the returns using the public and private subsamples; 
nevertheless, along with using the whole sample, we included an extra covariate that controls for the origin 
of the IES. 
 
5. Estimation and Results 
 
As earlier mentioned, our empirical strategy specified in Section 4 wasfirst applied to the full sample 
(general).  Table 2, shows significantestimates (t-stat) from comparing the returns obtained as a result of 
holding a bachelor degree (basic scenario) with four different postsecondary degree labor market outcomes. 
It is worth mentioning that all the estimates registered over 99% of common support (except by Master 
degree which registered 92% of common support) and the key covariates were balanced across the 
treatment and control groups (Annex 1). 
 
As can been seen, the economic returns of an individual who holds a bachelor degree,had he chosen a 
professional-technical program, would have been 9,24% higher compared with the average bachelor degree 
monthly wage. The reason for this might be that professional-technical programs are focused on specific job 
and career needs, which means that the individual developed a certain degree of proficiency on specific tasks 
that are compensated through a higher salary.  
 
On the other hand, had the individual chosen a technological program, his returns would have been 
approximately 7, 17% lower than the average bachelor degree monthly wage. Usually, technical programs 
have a 1 or 2 year duration (compared with the 4 or 5 year duration of bachelor degree) and the tuition costs 
are lower than those of bachelor degrees. 
 
Finally, improving a bachelor degree with a specialization or with a master course increases the economic 
returns by 61,6% and 83,9%, respectively. It can be noted that gaining expertise in specific knowledge areas 
brings higher economic returns to individuals.  
 
                                                             
13 Recalculated using the method me mentioned earlier (section 4.1) 
14 On-line courses (a distancia) or if the student has to attend classes physically (presencial) 
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Analyzing the data by the institution origin, it can be seen that the results are slightly different. Table 3 
shows the results for those degrees obtained at private institutions15. Under this setup, it can be seen that 
even though the magnitudes of the variations in the economic returns change, the direction of the effectsis 
concordant with the results obtained with the full sample (general). 
 
Analyzing the economic returns that an individual who holds a bachelor degree from a private institution 
would have had had he chosen a professional-technical degree also from a private institution, an increase of 
72, 86% on his returns (much higher than on a general scenario) is observed. Had the individual chosen a 
technological degree, his wage would have been 3,41% lower. 
 
Finally, had the individual chosen a specialization, his economic returns would have been 35,46% higher, 
and had he held a Master degree, his returns would have been 49,98% higher.Comparing these results with 
those obtained with the full sample, it can be inferred that private institutions report higher economic 
returns as more specific abilities are developed (professional-technical). 
 
Table 4 exhibits the results for the public institutions subsample estimations16; they show that had an 
individual who held a bachelor degree from a public institution chosen a professional-technical degree, he 
would have gotten a 29, 37% lower wage. Similarly, had he chosen a technological program, his returns 
would have been 14, 28% lower. 
 
On the other hand, had an individual who holds a bachelor degree chosen to attend a specialization, his 
economic returns would have been 70, 66% higher than the average bachelor degree monthly wage. 
Similarly, had the individual chosen to attend a master’s program, his wage would have been more than 
twice the wage he receives as a bachelor graduate.This shows that only specialization and master programs 
at public institutions would have reported higher economic returns than alternative scenarios. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
By integrating information at the individual level that includes socioeconomic background, labor market 
outcomes, IES characteristics, tuition costs and especially individuals’ cognitive abilities, we were able to 
obtain novel empirical evidence about the economic returns of postsecondary education in Colombia. These 
estimations are much more precise because they consider the presence of heterogeneity by including 
individuals’ abilities17; this makes the estimation of parallel scenarios (comparing postsecondary education 
degrees’ labor market outcomes) much more useful for public policy than previous research. 
 
Our estimations are based on comparing the economic returns across postsecondary education academic 
degrees using as the returns perceived while holding a bachelor degree as the basic scenario. The estimations 
show in a broad sense that getting a master’s degree or a specialization degree will always be better than a 
bachelor’s degree. For private institutions, a master’s degree would increase individual’s wage in 41% and for 
public ones the increase would be approximately 114%. For specializations, in private institutions, this 
degree increases wages approximately 35, 56%, and in public institutions, 70, 66%.  
 
This also gives a hint about higher wages if the academic degree (graduate degree) was obtained from public 
institutions. 
 
When comparing the results with professional-technical degrees, it is interesting to note that the results vary 
different depending on the origin of the institution. If the professional-technical degree was obtained from a 
private institution, wages are 72, 86% higher, but if this degree was obtained from a public institution, the 
wages would be 29, 37% lower.  
                                                             
15 All the estimates for the private subsample registered over 95% of common support (except by Master Degree, which registered 94% of common support) and 
the key covariates were balanced across the treatment and control groups. 
16 All the estimates for the private subsample registered over 98% of common support (except by Master Degree, which registered 87% of common support) and 
the key covariates were balanced across the treatment and control groups. 
17 As mentioned before, we consider that standardized test scores such as SABER-11 reflect not only individuals’ cognitive abilities, but also non-cognitive ones to 
an extent. 
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Regarding technological degrees, our results show lower wages than the bachelor degree in all scenarios. If 
the institution was private, the economic returns were 3,41% lower, and if the institution was public, the 
wages were 14,28% lower. 
 
These results lead to the question of how much the labor market valuates the origin of the institution and if 
the quality of the degrees is associated with it;this is because our estimations always show lower wages for all 
postsecondary degrees that were obtained in a public institution.  
 
In addition, these results permit us to identify which academic degrees of postsecondary education bring 
higher economic returns to individuals. For private institutions, professional-technical degrees bring higher 
economic returns, and for public institutions, master degrees. The implications of these results can be used 
when prioritizing public expenditure on postsecondary education. 
 
Through these results, we can also determine which postsecondary education degrees require further 
analysisto identify the reasons for their low economic returns, such as the technological degrees (from both 
public and private institutions) and the professional-technical degree from public institutions. 
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Table 1: IES Academic Classification 
 
Academic Classification of IES Undergraduate 
Programs 
Graduate 
Programs  
Professional-Technical  
Institutions(programs for a  
particular career or job) 
- Professional Technical Programs - Professional Technical Specializations 
Technological Institutions (1) - Professional Technical Programs 
-Technological Programs 
- Professional Technical Specializations 
-Technological Specializations 
University Institutions 
(all undergraduate programs and  
graduate programs up to specializations) 
- Professional Technical Programs 
-Technological Programs 
-Professional Programs 
- Professional Technical Specializations 
-Technological Specializations 
-Professional Specializations 
Universities 
(all undergraduate and all graduate  
programs) 
- Professional Technical Programs 
-Technological Programs 
-Professional Programs 
- Professional Technical Specializations 
-Technological Specializations 
-Professional Specializations 
-Master Degree Programs 
-Doctoral Degree Programs 
 
Source: Authors withinformation from the MEN 
 
Note:  Each type of IES by academic classification is also divided by origin (public or private)  
1. Technological institutions are focused on different knowledge areas than professional-technical 
institutions. The latter are focused on upgrading specific career or job knowledge. 
 
Table 2: General Control Group: Bachelor Degree 
          
Academic Degree 
(treatment) 
Treated Controls Difference S.E.  t-stat Variation 
respect to the 
mean 
Professional-Technical 854.494,36 772.243,67 82.250,68 35.707,99 2,30 9,24% 
Technological 695.850,18 759.643,58 -63.793,40 13.274,04 -4,81 -7,17% 
Specialization 1.517.165,61 968.857,14 548.308,47 40.131,27 13,66 61,60% 
Master 1.814.679,02 1.067.787,56 746.891,47 155.487,64 4,80 83,90% 
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Table 3: Private Control Group: Bachelor Degree 
             
Academic Degree 
(treatment) 
Treated Controls Difference S.E.  t-stat Variation 
respect to 
the mean 
Professional-Technical 1.340.089,34 643.879,90 696.209,44 102.151,92 6,82 72,86% 
Technological 676.397,54 709.002,43 -32.604,89 16.723,48 -1,96 -3,41% 
Specialization 1170973,87 832.128 338.846 64.475 5,26 35,46% 
Master 1408647,08 1017058,54 391.589 185.256 2,11 40,98% 
 
Table 4: Public Control Group: Bachelor Degree 
             
Academic Degree 
(treatment) 
Treated Controls Difference S.E.  t-stat Variation 
respect to 
the mean 
Professional-Technical 640.891,82 874.420,06 -233.528,24 28.643,51 -8,15 -29,37% 
Technological 726.809,07 840.365,25 -113.556,18 22.019,38 -5,16 -14,28% 
Specialization 1.607.368,22 1.045.586,09 561.782,13 50.126,07 11,21 70,66% 
Master 2.026.075,65 1.120.506,97 905.568,68 204.213,23 4,43 113,90% 
 
Annex 1: Balance across Covariates 
 
In order to verify if the covariates were balanced across treatment and control groups, we used the following 
criteria for balance: 
 
Unbalance level 3 (U3) Unbalance level 2 (U2) Unbalance level 1 (U1) Balanced (*) 
>2,6 1,96=< t < 2,6  1,64=< t < 1,96  t < 1,64 Serious Moderate Small 
 
Even though most of our covariates are balanced (covariates’ means do not significantly different across 
treatment and control groups) we identified some covariates with a U3 level of unbalance. In that case, we 
applied the rule of a thumb that states that a percentage of bias of less than 10% is acceptable.  
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General Sample 
 
 Technical - Profesional  Technological 
 Treated Control %bias t-test    Treated Control %bias t-test   
age 24,76 24,83 -4,7 1,61 *  24,68 24,70 -1,6 1,33 * 
sex 0,55 0,54 2,1 -0,12 *  0,49 0,49 -0,2 -1,55 * 
edu_mom 3,20 3,19 0,7 1,00 *  3,17 3,14 2,0 1,09 * 
edu_dad 3,20 3,21 -0,2 1,13 *  3,14 3,12 1,3 1,03 * 
matricula 5.300.000 5.300.000 -1,0 1,34 *  5.000.000 5.000.000 -3,3 0,73 * 
meto 1,04 1,03 3,8 1,52 *  1,12 1,11 4,3 -1,76 U1 
acred 0,00 0,00 0,0 0,05 *  0,12 0,10 4,5 1,90 U1 
pre_afines 0,02 0,01 2,3 1,67    0,040 0,038 0,6 -1,16 * 
aportantes 1,58 1,60 -2,8 -1,04 *  1,54 1,55 -1,3 1,70 U1 
math 37,47 36,77 2,5 1,73 U1  38,58 38,42 0,6 1,10 * 
language 31,98 31,96 0,1 1,28 *  34,94 34,66 1,0 1,43 * 
biology 32,59 32,73 -0,5 1,36 *  35,46 35,19 1,0 1,56 * 
chemistry 32,27 32,25 0,1 1,65 U1  35,80 35,55 0,9 1,93 U1 
physics 36,63 36,53 0,4 1,06 *  39,67 39,83 -0,6 1,35 * 
ies_orig 1,698 1,705 -1,3 -1,47 *  1,39 1,41 -4,7 1,88 U1 
 
 Specialization  Master 
 Treated Control %bias t-test    Treated Control %bias t-test   
age 25,18 25,14 3,2 -1,64 U1  25,20 25,27 -5,1 -1,08 * 
sex 0,37 0,37 -0,1 0,82 *  0,53 0,48 10,7 1,9 U1 
edu_mom 4,55 4,38 10 -1,1 *  4,89 4,57 1,8 -1,58 * 
edu_dad 4,56 4,37 11 -1,31 *  4,97 4,72 14 -1,36 * 
matricula 6.600.000 6.300.000 9,5 -1,67 U1  6.400.000 6.200.000 8,6 -1,05 * 
meto 1,02 1,03 -4,8 2,31 U2  1,01 1,01 0 0,94 * 
acred 0,53 0,41 5,4 -1,63 *  0,86 0,70 3,8 -1,47 * 
pre_afines 0,45 0,54 -2,6 -2,70 U3  0,40 0,60 -6,7 -2,11 U2 
aportantes 1,58 1,58 0,5 1,02 *  1,61 1,61 0 0,6 * 
math 51,49 49,64 6,3 -1,94 U1  66,20 64,01 7,3 -1,72 U1 
language 53,74 50,35 8,7 -1,49 *  65,32 62,61 6,2 -0,81 * 
biology 52,63 49,95 9,2 -1,71 U1  65,41 64,53 8,3 -1,41 * 
chemistry 54,21 51,51 9,3 -1,56 *  70,15 66,68 7,5 -1,28 * 
physics 50,52 48,57 6,7 -0,47 *  65,54 64,80 2,5 -1,29 * 
ies_orig 1,79 1,78 1,7 -1,65 U1  1,63 1,64 -3,9 -4,42 U3 
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Private Institutions Subsample 
 
 Technical - Profesional  Technological 
 Treated Control %bias t-test    Treated Control %bias t-test   
age 24,93 24,95 -1,4 -1,25 *  24,63 24,67 -2,7 1,65 U1 
sex 0,68 0,67 1,1 -1,01 *  0,51 0,49 3,1 -2,19 U2 
edu_mom 2,81 2,78 1,6 1,64 U1  3,03 3,00 1,9 1,76 U1 
edu_dad 2,85 2,88 -2,1 1,57 *  3,00 2,98 1,6 1,02 * 
matricula 5.800.000 5.800.000 2,9 1,51 *  4.800.000 4.800.000 -1,9 0,94 * 
meto 1,00 1,00 0,5 0,34 *  1,16 1,15 3,5 -0,93 * 
acred 0,01 0,01 1,7 0,59 *  0,19 0,17 3,7 1,26 * 
pre_afines 0,00 0,00 0,9 -0,5 *  0,02 0,02 2,2 -0,6 * 
aportantes 1,53 1,50 3,5 1,85 U1  1,50 1,50 0,9 1,74 U1 
math 35,59 35,57 0,1 1,49 *  39,44 39,08 1,3 2,67 U3 
language 24,72 25,23 -2,0 1,7 U1  35,85 35,88 -0,1 1,81 U1 
biology 27,70 27,66 0,2 0,73 *  36,19 35,85 1,2 1,39 * 
chemistry 29,11 29,81 -2,6 1,98 U2  36,38 35,74 2,3 1,22 * 
physics 35,49 37,12 -6,0 2,23 U2  39,98 39,27 2,5 1,96 U2 
 
 Specialization  Master 
 Treated Control %bias t-test    Treated Control %bias t-test   
age 25,04 25,10 -3,8 -0,97 *  25,01 25,28 -9,5 -2,31 U2 
sex 0,43 0,48 -9,7 -2,2 U2  0,49 0,50 -2,6 -1,23 * 
edu_mom 3,96 3,99 -1,6 -1,29 *  3,72 3,80 -4,4 -2,48 U2 
edu_dad 3,94 3,95 -0,7 -1,26 *  3,70 3,87 -9,8 -4,31 U3 
matricula 6.500.000 6.500.000 2,4 -1,52 *  6.200.000 6.000.000 14,7 -1,17 * 
meto 1,03 1,04 -5,7 1,22 *  1,00 1,00 --- --- --- 
acred 0,46 0,37 16,7 0,14 *  0,78 0,75 5,8 -1,92 U1 
pre_afines 0,37 0,37 -0,9 -1,57 *  0,34 0,36 -3,7 -1,09 * 
aportantes 1,55 1,56 -1,3 -0,43 *  1,57 1,61 -5,9 -1,05 * 
math 51,81 48,35 7,6 0,41 *  58,40 63,50 -6,9 -1,69 U1 
language 52,80 50,90 6,6 -2,19 U2  50,86 56,93 -7,0 -1,65 U1 
biology 52,74 51,25 5,1 -3,3 U3  52,71 53,71 -3,2 -0,7 * 
chemistry 53,51 50,82 9,1 0,18 *  57,05 57,70 -2,1 -1,72 U1 
physics 50,11 44,41 11,6 4,73 U3  53,79 52,76 3,2 -2,29 U2 
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Public Institutions Subsample 
 
 Technical - Profesional  Technological 
 Treated Control %bias t-test    Treated Control %bias t-test   
age 24,68 24,73 -2,70 1,55 *  24,76 24,74 1,50 1,51 * 
sex 0,49 0,49 -0,50 -1,02 *  0,46 0,45 2,70 -1,58 * 
edu_mom 3,37 3,37 0,10 0,07 *  3,38 3,35 2,00 1,31 * 
edu_dad 3,36 3,36 0,20 0,09 *  3,37 3,33 2,10 1,53 * 
matricula 5.100.000 5.100.000 -2,30 1,74 U1  5.300.000 5.400.000 -2,80 1,02 * 
meto 1,05 1,04 5,30 -1,65 U1  1,04 1,04 3,00 1,93 U1 
acred 0,00 0,00 --- --- ---  0,01 0,01 -0,10 2,06 U2 
pre_afines 0,02 0,02 -0,20 1,48 *  0,07 0,06 3,90 1,13 * 
aportantes 1,60 1,57 3,40 0,45 *  1,59 1,59 0,50 0,36 * 
math 38,27 37,87 1,50 1,53 *  37,21 37,21 0,00 1,38 * 
language 35,12 35,81 -2,60 1,68 U1  33,49 33,48 0,00 1,86 U1 
biology 34,71 34,62 0,30 1,39 *  34,29 33,82 1,80 1,72 U1 
chemistry 33,65 33,10 2,10 1,22 *  34,87 35,02 -0,60 1,89 U1 
physics 37,14 36,68 1,70 1,93 U1  39,17 38,29 3,20 1,47 * 
            
 
 Specialization  Master 
 Treated Control %bias t-test    Treated Control %bias t-test   
age 25,19 25,21 -1,00 -1,76 U1  25,32 25,38 -4,60 -1,35 * 
sex 0,36 0,35 1,50 1,08 *  0,55 0,50 9,80 -1,55 * 
edu_mom 4,69 4,49 1,70 -1,96 U2  5,54 5,05 3,30 -0,90 * 
edu_dad 4,71 4,48 3,70 -1,46 *  5,69 5,16 9,30 -1,29 * 
matricula 6.600.000 6.300.000 6,90 -2,17 U2  6.400.000 6.600.000 -10,90 -2,10 U2 
meto 1,02 1,03 -2,20 -3,31 U3  1,02 1,00 3,80 1,30 * 
acred 0,54 0,42 5,30 -1,42 *  0,90 0,77 9,20 -11,49 U3 
pre_afines 0,46 0,56 -7,10 -1,65 U1  0,40 0,62 -8,70 -2,39 U2 
aportantes 1,59 1,56 5,20 1,55 *  1,64 1,57 10,40 0,68 * 
math 51,29 50,40 3,00 -1,8 U1  70,16 61,10 10,70 -1,76 U1 
language 53,67 51,14 8,70 -4,1 U3  73,06 68,09 8,10 -1,31 * 
biology 52,54 50,71 6,30 -1,57 *  71,85 67,69 5,40 -1,36 * 
chemistry 54,09 51,45 9,20 -2,16 U2  76,49 74,33 7,50 -1,92 U1 
physics 50,51 48,46 7,10 -1,14 *  71,57 67,45 8,70 -1,59 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
